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Abstract. Over the years, Critical Infrastructures (CI) have revealed themselves 
to be extremely disaster-prone, be the disasters nature-based or man-made. This 
paper focuses on a specific category of CI: Critical Information Infrastructures 
(CII), which are commonly deemed to include communication and information 
networks. The majority of all the other CI (e.g. electricity, fuel and water sup-
ply, transport systems, etc.) are crucially dependent on CII. Therefore, problems 
associated with CII that disrupt the services they are able to provide (whether to 
a single end-user or to another CI) are of increasing interest. This paper dis-
cusses some recent developments in optimization models regarding CII¶VDELOLW\ 
to withstand disruptive events within three main spheres: network survivability 
assessment, network resource allocation strategy and survivable design. 
Keywords: Critical Information Infrastructures (CII) Â6XUYLYDELOLW\Â Resource 
Allocation Strategy Â Survivable Network Design 
1 Introduction 
Infrastructures considered critical (CI) are those physical and information-based facil-
ities, networks and assets which if damaged would have serious impacts on the well-
being of citizens, proper functioning of governments and industries or result in other 
adverse effects [20]. The nature of these infrastructures, along with the potential 
threats arising from disasters, whether nature-based or man-made, has prompted what 
is referred to as Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). 
This paper focuses on a specific category of CI, namely the Critical Information In-
frastructures (CII), and reviews recent developments in the optimization field aimed 
at addressing Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) issues. 
CII are described as those systems, belonging to the Information and Communica-
tion Technology, which are critical - not just for their own sakes, but for other CI that 
rely on them (e.g., transportation) [36]. Examples of CII are the public telephone net-
work, Internet, terrestrial and satellite wireless networks and so on and so forth [25].  
CIIP is defined as those plans and strategies developed by network operators, in-
frastructure owners and others, aimed at keeping the service level of CII above a pre-
determined threshold, despite the occurrence of disruptive events of various natures 
[35]. It is clear that CII are key elements in production and service systems. Even a 
2 
 
local failure at the single CII level (e.g. shut down servers, interrupted cable connec-
tions, etc.) may prompt far-reaching adverse effects on the CI relying on it. Bigger 
disruptions may have even more catastrophic cascading consequences. For example, 
the 2001 World Trade Center attacks crippled communications by destroying tele-
phone and Internet lines, electric circuits and cellular towers ([10], [18]). This caused 
a cascade of disruptions at all levels, from fuel shortages, to transportation and finan-
cial services interruptions.  
The disruptive events that can affect CII are primarily identified as physical attacks 
or cyber-attacks. This paper focuses on the former. Three main issues emerge. First, 
what are the most critical elements of the system that, if disrupted, would interrupt or 
significantly degrade the V\VWHP¶V normal functioning? Second, how can such an 
interruption be prevented or mitigated by resource allocation plans, aimed either at 
hardening system elements or at recovering service? Third, is it possible and worth-
while to design and establish infrastructures that are intrinsically able to resist service 
failure when a disruptive event occurs?  
The main optimization models developed to address these issues can be catego-
rized as follows:  
1. Survivability-oriented interdiction models, aimed at identifying interdiction scenar-
ios of CII and quantifying the consequences deriving from potential losses of sys-
tem critical components in terms of ability to provide service;  
2. Resource allocation strategy models, aimed at optimizing the allocation of re-
sources (i.e., budget) among the components of already existent systems in order to 
either protect them or to re-establish service level; and  
3. Survivable design models, aimed at planning new CII which are able to meet sur-
vivability criteria when disruptive events occur. 
In this paper, we provide a description of the seminal models in each category and 
suggest how these models can be taken as the starting point for further development 
in the CIIP field.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Survivability-oriented inter-
diction, resource allocation strategy and survivable design models are described in 
Sections 2, 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5, further research suggestions in model-
ing CIIP problems are discussed. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
2 Identifying Critical Network Components: Survivability-
Oriented Interdiction Models 
The identification of critical components in network-based systems can be traced back 
to a few decades ago in the context of transportation infrastructures for military pur-
poses [38]. More recently, [4] introduced optimization models for identifying critical 
facilities in service and supply systems.  
Interdiction models, as referred to in the literature, identify network components 
which are the most critical, i.e. the ones that, if disrupted, inflict the most serious 
damage to the system. The importance of these kinds of models is easily understanda-
ble: they not only shed light on a system¶V major vulnerabilities, but also help form 
the basis for developing protection and/or recovery plans.  
Interdiction models are driven by specified criteria (also called impact metrics). 
When dealing with CII, such as communication and information networks, the two 
important criteria are network reliability and network survivability. In [31], network 
reliability is defined as the probability measure that a network functions according to 
a predefined specification; whereas, network survivability is defined as the ability of a 
network to maintain its communication capabilities in the face of equipment failure. 
Moreover, according to [31], it is possible to subdivide network survivability into two 
categories: physical survivability and logical survivability. A network is physically 
survivable if after the physical failure of some nodes or arcs, a path connecting all the 
nodes still exists. Logical survivability is about survivability at higher levels of the 
OSI model and assumes that the underlying physical network is survivable.   
Our interest is in evaluating how disruptive events impact a network¶V physical 
survivability by identifying its critical components, which can be nodes and/or arcs. 
In the case of communication and information networks, nodes can be switches, mul-
tiplexers, cross-connects, routers; arcs represent connections among them [31, 32]. 
Murray [18] identifies four metrics to evaluate network physical survivability: 
maximal flow ([38]), shortest path ([7]), connectivity ([14], [31]), and system flow 
([17], [19]). Here we provide an example of an optimization model designed to ascer-
tain the survivability of system flow. This model is a variation of the model intro-
duced in [19] and later extended and streamlined in [17]. It identifies the r most vital 
components of a network, i.e. those components which, if disrupted, maximize the 
amount of flow that can no longer be routed over the network. In the specific case of 
CII, the flow represents data and information. In the following, we will refer to this 
model as the Survivability Interdiction model (SIM).   
Given a network ܩሺܰǡ ܣሻ, where ܰ is the set of nodes and ܣ is the set of arcs, let ߗ 
be the set of origin nodes, indexed by o; H the set of elements (nodes/arcs) that can be 
disrupted, indexed by h; ߂ the set of destination nodes, indexed by d, ܲ the set of 
paths, indexed by p; ௢ܰௗ the set of paths enabling flow between an origin-destination 
pair o-d; ߔ௣ the set of components belonging to path ݌; ௢݂ௗ the flow routed between 
an o-d pair; and ݎ the number of components to be disabled. The decision variables 
are: ܵ௛equal to 1 if component h is disrupted, 0 otherwise; and ܺ௢ௗ equal to 1 if flow 
cannot be routed between a pair o-d, 0 otherwise. The mathematical formulation is: 
 ݉ܽݔݖ ൌ   ?  ? ௢݂ௗܺ௢ௗௗא௱௢אఆ    (1) 
s.t.    ? ܵ௛ ൒௛אథ೛ ܺ௢ௗ  ׊݋ א ߗǡ ݀ א ߂ǡ ݌ א ௢ܰௗ (2)  ? ܵ௛௛אு ൌ ݎ                                  (3) ܵ௛ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ ׊h א ܪ (4) ܺ௢ௗ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ ׊݋ א ߗǡ ݀ א ߂ (5) 
 
The objective function (1) maximizes the total flow disrupted (or interdicted). Con-
straints (2) state that the flow between an o-d pair can be considered lost (௢ௗ ൌ  ?ሻ, 
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only if every path connecting nodes o and d is affected by the disruption (i.e., at least 
one of its arc is disrupted). Constraint (3) is a typical cardinality constraint which 
stipulates that exactly ݎ arcs are to be disrupted. Finally, constraints (4) and (5) repre-
sent the binary restrictions on the interdiction and flow variables, respectively. 
The original SIM in [19] only considers arc disruption. It was later modified to 
address node disruption in [17]. This work also presents a variant of SIM which iden-
tifies lower bounds to the flow loss caused by the disruption of ݎ nodes, thus allowing 
the assessment of both best-case and worst-case scenario losses. This kind of analysis 
is useful to build the so-called reliability envelope, a diagram originally developed in 
[22] to depict possible outcomes for the failure of communication systems. SIM was 
applied to the Abilene network, an Internet-2 backbone with 11 routers and 14 linkag-
es connecting US institutions. The analysis shows that the worst-case interdiction of 
one node (Washington, D.C.) can cause a data flow decrease of over 37%; a two-node 
interdiction scenario (Washington, D.C. and Indianapolis) a decrease of over 73%. 
One arguable aspect of existing interdiction models such as SIM is that the num-
ber of components to be disrupted is fixed to a specific and known value ݎ. This as-
sumption is made to capture the possible extents of disruptive events: large values of ݎ mimic large disruptions involving the simultaneous loss of several components, 
while small values are used to model minor disruptions [15]. In practice, it is difficult 
to anticipate the extent of a disruption and therefore select a suitable ݎ value. In addi-
tion, the critical components identified for a small ݎ value are not necessarily a subset 
of the critical components identified for larger values. Consequently, these models are 
usually run for several values of ݎ so as to identify the most vital components across 
disruption scenarios of different magnitude [17].  
Another aspect worth mentioning is that the use of cardinality constraints like (3) 
is useful for identifying worst-case scenario losses caused by natural disasters. How-
ever, in case of malicious attacks, models must capture the fact that different amount 
and type of resources (e.g., human, financial etc.) may be needed in a concerted attack 
to fully disable network components and cause maximum damage [28]. From an at-
WDFNHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHin fact, resources may vary significantly according to the target. 
This is particularly true within the context of physical survivability as opposed to 
logical survivability. For example, a physical attack on a relatively small number of 
major switching centers for long-distance telecommunications may require considera-
bly more resources than launching a logic denial-of-service attack on the Internet. 
However, the former type of attack may cause much longer lasting damage [13].  
This aspect can be captured by either replacing (3) with a budget constraint (see 
[1] and [15] in the context of distribution systems) or by developing models that di-
rectly minimize the attacker expenditure to achieve a given level of disruption.  Ex-
amples of the latter can be found in [14]. This work presents some mixed integer pro-
gramming models which minimize the cost incurred by an attacker to disconnect the 
network according to different survivability metrics (e.g., degree of disconnectivity). 
These attacker models are then used to assess the robustness of two protection re-
source allocation strategies: a uniform allocation (the defense budget is distributed 
equally among the nodes) and a degree-based allocation (the budget is distributed 
among the nodes proportionally to their degree of connectivity). As it will be dis-
cussed in the next section, this approach, where protection decisions are not tackled 
explicitly within a mathematical model but are only assessed and/or developed on the 
basis of the results of an interdiction model, often leads to a suboptimal allocation of 
protective resources. 
Another aspect that interdiction models must capture is the fact that the outcome of 
an attack is highly uncertain.  When dealing with malicious disruptions, this is a cru-
cial issue as attackers, such as terrorists or hackers, aim at allocating their offensive 
resources so as to maximize their probability of success. Clearly, there is a correlation 
between the amount of offensive resources invested and the probability of success of 
an attack: the more the former, the higher the latter. Church and Scaparra [5] intro-
duce an interdiction model for distribution systems where an interdiction is successful 
with a given probability and the objective is to maximize the expected disruption of 
an attack on ݎ facilities. Losada et al. [15] further extend this model by assuming that 
the probability of success of an interdiction attempt is dependent on the magni-
tude/intensity of the disruption. Similar extensions could be developed for SIM to 
assess the survivability of physical networks to attacks with uncertain outcomes. 
3 Enhancing Critical Network Survivability: Resource 
Allocation Strategy Models 
Optimization approaches can be used to improve CII survivability by optimizing 
investments in protection measures and in service recovery plans.    
CII protection measures may be divided into three different categories: technical 
(e.g. security administration), management (e.g. security awareness, technical train-
ing) and operational (e.g. physical security) (see [37]).  Our interest lies in the last 
category. Examples of physical security measures include: alarms, motion detectors, 
biometric scanners, badge swipes, access codes, and human and electronic surveil-
lance, e.g. Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems (PIDS) and Closed Circuit Televi-
sion (CCTV) [20]. In a broader sense, protection strategies may include increasing 
redundancy and diversity [34]. Redundancy consists in creating one or more copies of 
the same network element/content and is key to tackle random uncorrelated failures. 
Diversity aims at avoiding components of a system to undergo the same kind of fail-
ure and is used to tackle correlated failures.  
Service recovery is intimately connected with the concept of survivability since it 
involves bringing the infrastructure to the level of service it was able to provide be-
fore a disruption and, normally, as timely as possible. In this perspective, optimization 
approaches provide a useful tool to identify the optimal trade-off between the level of 
service to restore and the amount of resources to invest over a certain time horizon.  
3.1 Optimization Models for Protecting CII Physical Components  
Although interdiction models like SIM are instrumental for the identification of the 
most critical CII components, protection resource allocation approaches which solely 
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rely on this information to prioritize protection investments often result in suboptimal 
defensive strategies ([2], [6]). This is due to the fact that when a component (e.g., the 
most critical) is protected, the criticality of the other components may change. Protec-
tions and interdictions decisions must therefore be addressed in an integrated way.  
This is typically done by using bi-level optimization programs [8]. These programs 
are hierarchical optimization models which emulate the game between two players, 
referred to as leader and follower. In the CIIP context, the leader is the network opera-
tor or infrastructure owner, who decides which system components to protect; the 
follower represents a saboteur (hacker or terrorist) who tries to inflict maximum dam-
age to the system by disabling some of its components. The defender decisions are 
modeled in the upper level program, whereas the inner-level program models the 
attacker decisions and, therefore, computes worst-case scenario losses in response to 
the protection strategy identified in the upper level.  
Below we present a bi-level program for CIIP, which embeds SIM in the inner-
level. We refer to it as the Survivability Protection Problem (SPP). In addition to the 
parameters and variables defined in Section 2, SPP uses the following notation: ܤ is 
the total budget available for protection; ܿ௛ is the unit cost for protecting component 
h; ܼ௛is a decision variable equal to 1 if componenth is protected, 0 otherwise.  
SPP can be formulated as follows: 
 ݉݅݊ܪሺݖሻ  (6) 
s.t.    ? ܿ௛ܼ௛ ൑ ܤ௛אு    (7) ܼ௛ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ  ׊h א ܪ   (8) ܪሺݖሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔ  ?  ? ௢݂ௗܺ௢ௗௗא௱௢אఆ    (9) 
s.t.   
     (2) - (5)   ܵ௛ ൑  ? െ ௛ܼ   ׊h א ܪ (10) 
 
The upper level model identifies which network components to protect given limited 
budgetary resources (7) so as to minimize a function, ܪሺݖሻ, which represents the 
highest flow loss (6) resulting from the interdiction of ݎ components. The inner-level 
model is the SIM with the additional set of constraints (10) which guarantee that if a 
component is protected, it cannot be attacked. 
Protection models like SPP can be extended in a number of ways. For example, 
protection investments over time could be considered, given that funds for enhancing 
CI security usually become available at different times. An example of bi-level pro-
tection models that considers dynamic investments can be found in [33] within the 
context of transportation infrastructure. Probabilistic extensions of SPP should also be 
considered, where the protection of an element does not completely prevent its inter-
diction, but may reduce its probability of failure. Other issues that should be captured 
are the uncertainty in the number of simultaneous losses of components (see for ex-
ample [11]), and the correlation among components failures [12].  
Obviously, there are other approaches other than bi-level programming which can 
be used to optimize protection strategies. For example, Viduto et al. [37] combine a 
risk assessment procedure for the identification of system risks with a multi-objective 
optimization model for the selection of protection countermeasures. To mitigate 
cyber-threats, Sawik [27] uses mixed integer models in conjunction with a conditional 
value-at-risk approach to identify optimal protection countermeasure portfolios under 
different risk preferences of the decision maker (risk-adverse vs. risk neutral).   
3.2 Optimization Models for CII Service Restoration 
An interesting model for the optimization of recovery investments is the Networked 
Infrastructure Restoration Model (NIRM) introduced in [16]. NIRM is a multi-
objective optimization model for the evaluation of tradeoffs between flow restoration 
and system costs over time. 
NIRM uses the following additional notation: ߁௡ is the set of inoperable nodes, ߁௟  
the set of inoperable arcs, ߔ௣௡ the set of disrupted nodes along path ݌, ߔ௣௟  the set of 
disrupted arcs along path ݌, ܶ the set of planning periods; ௢݂ௗ is the flow routed be-
tween the pair o-d; ܿ௣௧ the cost of traversing path ݌ during planning period ݐ; ߣ௜ and  ߣ௝ the costs of restoring operation at node ݅ and arc ݆, respectively; ܪ௧௡ and ܪ௧௟  the 
budget for node and arc restoration during planning period t; ߚ௧ the weight for im-
portance of repair in time ݐ; ܥ௢ௗ௧ is a large quantity representing the cost of a disrupt-
ed pair o-d during planning period ݐ. The decision variables are: ௣ܻ௧, equal to 1 if path ݌ is available in time ݐ, 0 otherwise; ௜ܸ௧௡ ( ௝ܸ௧௟ , ) equal to 1 if node ݅ (arc j) is restored in 
time ݐ, 0 otherwise; and ௢ܹௗ௧, equal to 1 if connectivity does not exist between a pair 
o-d in time ݐ, 0 otherwise. The formulation is the following: 
 ݉ܽݔ  ?  ?  ?  ? ߚ௧ ௢݂ௗ ௣ܻ௧௧א்௣אே೚೏ௗא௱௢אఆ   (11) ݉݅݊  ?  ?  ? ܥ௢ௗ௧ ௢ܹௗ௧௧א்ௗא௱ ൅௢אఆ  ?  ?  ?  ? ܿ௣௧ ௣ܻ௧௧א்௣אே೚೏ௗא௱௢אఆ   (12) 
s.t.    ? ߣ௜ ௜ܸ௧௡௜א௰೙ ൑  ܪ௧௡   ׊ݐ א ܶ (13)  ? ߣ௝ ௝ܸ௧௟௝א௰೗ ൑  ܪ௧௟   ׊ݐ א ܶ (14)  ? ௜ܸ௧௡௧א் ൑  ?  ׊݅ א ߁௡ (15)  ? ௝ܸ௧௟௧א் ൑  ?  ׊݆ א ߁௟  (16) ௣ܻ௧ െ  ? ௜ܸ௧መ௡௧መஸ௧ ൑  ?       ׊݌ א ܲǡ ݅ א ߔ௣௡ǡ ݐ א ܶ (17) ௣ܻ௧ െ  ? ௝ܸ௧መ௟௧መஸ௧ ൑  ?                      ׊݌ א ܲǡ ݆ א ߔ௣௟ ǡ ݐ א ܶ (18)  ? ௣ܻ௧ ൅ ௢ܹௗ௧௣אே೚೏ ൌ  ?  ׊݋ א ߗǡ ݀ א ߂ǡ ݐ א ܶ (19) ௣ܻ௧ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ ׊݌ א ܲǡ ݐ א ܶ (20) ௜ܸ௧௡ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ ׊݅ א ߁௡ ǡ ݐ א ܶ (21) ௝ܸ௧௟ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ ׊݆ א ߁௟ ǡ ݐ א ܶ (22) ௢ܹௗ௧ ൌ ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ ׊݋ א ߗǡ ݀ א ߂ǡ ݐ א ܶ (23) 
 
The objective function (11) maximizes system flow or connectivity while objective 
(12) minimizes system cost and it is made up of two components, disruption and path 
usage. Constraints (13) and (14) are budget constraints on node and arc recovery in 
each planning period ݐ. Constraints (15) and (16) restrict node and arc repair to a sin-
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gle time period. Constraints (17) and (18) state that a path ݌ is available in period ݐ 
only if each of its disrupted component (node ݅or arc ݆ respectively) is repaired in 
period ݐ or in any of the preceding time periods. Constraints (19) track o-d pairs that 
are not connected in each time period and force the selection of at most one path be-
tween each o-d pair in each time period. Finally, constraints (20)-(23) represent the 
binary restrictions on the decision variables.  
NIRM was applied to support recovery planning after a simulated High Altitude 
Electromagnetic Pulse attack on a sample telecommunications backbone network with 
46 routers and 94 high-capacity backbones. Different restoration schedules over 6 
repair periods were generated and analyzed so as to highlight the tradeoffs between 
flow restoration and system costs. 
A limitation of NIRM is that the repair action is assumed to be instantaneous. 
Nurre et al. [21] consider the duration for component repair in an integrated restora-
tion planning optimization model which identifies the network components to be in-
stalled/repaired after a disruption and schedules them to available work groups. The 
objective is to maximize the cumulative amount of flow that can be routed across the 
network over a finite planning horizon. An interesting addition to the restoration 
modeling literature is the model in [29] which considers the important issue of restor-
ing multiple interdependent infrastructure systems (e.g., power, telecommunication, 
water). This work also presents tools to quantify the improvement in restoration effec-
tiveness resulting from information sharing and coordination among infrastructures. 
4 Planning Survivable Networks: Design Models  
Given the crucial importance of CII to the vast majority of economic activities and 
services, telecommunication and information systems are designed in such a way that 
they are intrinsically survivable, i.e. they satisfy some more or less stringent connec-
tivity criteria. The design of survivable network is a well-studied problem in the op-
timization field. For an early survey, the interested reader can refer to [31]. A com-
prehensive review of survivable network design models would be outside the scope of 
this paper. To provide a complete treatment of survivability related optimization prob-
lems, we only briefly discuss the Survivable Network Design (SND) model found in 
[32], one of the earliest and most studied models. 
Given an undirected graph ܩሺܰǡ ܧሻ, where ܰ is the set of nodes and ܧ is the set of 
undirected edges (݅ǡ ݆), each pair of communicating nodes is identified as a commodi-
ty ݇ (being ܭ the set of the commodities), whose origin and destination are labeled as ܱሺ݇ሻ and ܦሺ݇ሻ respectively. Let ܿ௜௝  be the design cost of edge (݅ǡ ݆ሻ, andݍ the num-
ber of node disjoint paths required for all the commodities (so the system will be able 
to face ݍ െ  ? failures at most). The decision variables are: ௜ܷ௝  equal to 1 if edge (݅ǡ ݆) 
is included in the design, 0 otherwise; and ௜ܺ௝௞  equal to 1 if commodity ݇ uses edge 
(݅ǡ ݆ሻ, 0 otherwise. The formulation is the following: 
 ݉݅݊ݖ ൌ   ? ܿ௜௝ ௜ܷ௝ሺ௜ǡ௝ሻאா    (24) 
s.t.   
 ? ௜ܺ௝௞௝אே െ  ? ௝ܺ௜௞௝אே ൌ ൝ ܳ݂݅݅ ؠ ܱሺ݇ሻെܳ݂݅݅ ؠ ܦሺ݇ሻ ?    ׊݇ א ܭ  (25) ௜ܺ௝௞ ൑ ௜ܷ௝  ׊݇ א ܭǡ ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ܧ (26) ௝ܺ௜௞ ൑ ௜ܷ௝  ׊݇ א ܭǡ ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ܧ (27)  ? ௜ܺ௝௞௜אே ൑  ?  ׊݇ א ܭǡ ݆ א ܰ ר ݆ ് ܦሺ݇ሻ (28) ௜ܺ௝௞ ǡ ௝ܺ௜௞ ൌ ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ݅ǡ ݆ א ܰ (29) ௜ܷ௝ ൌ ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ ׊݅ǡ ݆ א ܰ (30) 
 
The objective function (24) minimizes the cost of the topological network design. 
Constraints (25) guarantee network flow conservation. Constraints (26) and (27) stip-
ulate that flow can traverse an edge only if the edge is included in the design. The 
combined use of constraints (25), (26) and (27) enforce the edge-disjoint paths over 
the network. Constraints (28) guarantee that at most one unit of flow can traverse a 
node that is neither a commodity origin nor destination, thus ensuring the correct 
number of node-disjoint paths in the network. Finally, constraints (29) and (30) repre-
sent the binary restrictions on the variables. 
Many other survivable network design models can be found in the literature which 
differ in terms of underlying network (wired vs. wireless), network topology (e.g., 
ring, mesh, star, line, tree, etc.), connectivity requirements (e.g., edge and/or vertex-
connectivity), path-length restrictions (e.g., hop limits [24]), cost minimization [23], 
and dedicated settings (e.g., path protection, link and path restoration [24]) .  
Note that recent survivability design models embed interdiction models to ascertain 
components criticality ([3], [30]). Such models are able to identify cost-effective CII 
configurations which are inherently survivable without the need to specify the number 
of disjoint paths required between each pair of communicating nodes, like in SND. 
5 Future research suggestions 
The research on CIIP issues aimed at hedging against potential physical attacks is still 
evolving. The demand for such work has been prompted by disasters of diverse na-
ture, with 9/11 being a seminal one.  
The survivability optimization models discussed in this paper are basic models that 
can be extended in a number of ways. For example, interdiction and protection mod-
els could be extended to tackle both physical and logical survivability issues by incor-
porating routing and link capacity assignment decisions. In addition, most of the op-
timization models developed so far are deterministic. However, failures and disrup-
tions are random events, often difficult to predict. The probabilistic behaviour of 
complex CII under disruptions would be better modelled by using stochastic models, 
including uncertain parameters (e.g., uncertainty on arc / node availability, extent of a 
disruption, stochastic repair times, etc.). Alternatively, the uncertainty characterizing 
disruptions could be captured in scenario-based models which incorporate robustness 
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measures for the identification of solutions which perform well across different dis-
ruption scenarios [26].   
Future models could even combine the optimization of protection and restoration 
strategies in a unified framework so as to distribute resources efficiently across the 
different stages of the disaster management cycle (protection plans belong to the pre-
disaster stage while recovery plans refer to the post-disaster stage). Other resource 
allocation models could consider identifying tradeoff investments in physical protec-
tion and cyber-security to mitigate the impact of both physical and logical attacks. 
Models which address design and restoration issues conjunctively, such as the one in 
[23], also deserve further investigation.  
The models discussed in this paper have been solved by using a variety of optimi-
zation algorithms, including exact methods (e.g., decomposition) and heuristics (e.g. 
evolutionary algorithms). The development of more complex models, such as stochas-
tic, bi-level and multi-objective models, would necessarily require additional research 
into the development of more sophisticated solution techniques, possibly integrating 
exact and heuristic methodologies.  
Eventually, the ultimate challenge when developing optimization approaches for 
increasing CII survivability is to consider the interdependency among multiple CI and 
the potential cascading failures across different lifeline systems. As noted in [29], 
information sharing and coordination among infrastructures significantly improve the 
effectiveness of survivability strategies, as opposed to decentralized decision making. 
However, existing models that address network interdependencies are either overly 
simplistic or too theoretical [9]. This area certainly warrants further research. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper reviewed the research activities conducted over recent years in the field of 
CIIP aimed at mitigating the effects of physical attacks against CII components. This 
paper has investigated three main research areas: survivability assessment models, 
resource allocation strategy models (aimed at either protection or recovery plans), and 
survivable design models. 
Each model category has been designed to identify different crucial aspects: (a) 
under what circumstances is the infrastructure still able to provide its service; (b) how 
should resources be allocated in order to protect the infrastructure physical compo-
nents or to restore its level of service; (c) how should a new infrastructure be designed 
in order to be naturally survivable.   
The optimization models hereby discussed are valuable decision-making tools in 
tackling CII survivability issues but future work is undoubtedly needed. The reason 
lies in the intrinsic nature of CII: they are large-scale, heterogeneous, distributed sys-
tems whose complexity is continuously evolving in a risky environment. As such, 
modeling their dynamics and interdependency with other lifeline systems requires 
developing cutting-edge methodologies, which integrate methods from different dis-
ciplines (e.g., optimization, simulation, risk analysis, complex network theory and 
statistics) in a unified framework.  
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